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The Judicial Prerogative
Thomas W. Merrill*
In John Locke's account of separation of powers, the execu-
tive is not limited to enforcing the rules laid down by the legisla-
ture. The chief magistrate also exercises the prerogative, a power
"to act according to discretion for the public good, without the
prescription of the law and sometimes even against it."1 Locke
explained that such a discretionary power is required because "it
is impossible to foresee and so by laws to provide for all acci-
dents and necessities that may concern the public, or make such
laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible
rigor on all occasions and upon all persons that may come in
their way."'
Given their experience with George III, it is not surprising
that the Framers of the United States Constitution failed to em-
brace Locke's executive prerogative. The Supreme Court, for its
part, has also rejected it. "The Founders of this Nation en-
trusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good
times and bad," Justice Black wrote in his opinion for the Court
in the Steel Seizure Case.3 Justice Black concluded that the
President enjoys no inherent power to act in default of Congress;
his authority must in every case "stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.""
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 199 (Everyman ed. 1970).
2. Id. at 200.
3. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S.
579 (1952).
4. Id. at 585. Whether Justice Black's reasoning was in fact endorsed by a majority
of the Court is debatable. Although four other Justices joined in his opinion, they each
wrote separate concurring opinions. Of these separate concurring opinions, only those of
Justice Jackson and Justice Douglas clearly rejected the idea that the President's "exec-
utive power" entails certain inherent powers to act in default of Congress. See id. at 641
(Jackson, J. concurring); id. at 632-33 (Douglas, J. concurring). The concurring opinions
of Justice Frankfurter and Justice Burton reserved judgment on whether the President
might have inherent powers outside of the context of the issue presented in the case, id.
at 597 (Frankfurter, J. concurring); id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring). The four other
1
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The question I address in this paper is whether the conclu-
sion reached by Justice Black in the Steel Seizure Case applies
with equal force to the judicial branch of the federal govern-
ment. That is to say, do principles of separation of powers em-
bodied in the Constitution permit federal courts to exercise a
"judicial prerogative" - a power to promulgate federal rules of
decision "according to discretion for the public good, without
the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it" - or
are federal courts, like the President, constrained to act only
pursuant to authority found in enacted law?
I.
I will begin my inquiry, as often seems to be required in this
area, with some clarification of terms. What do I mean by "judi-
cial prerogative" and "enacted law," and why do I use these
terms instead of "federal common law"? By "judicial preroga-
tive," I refer to a power of courts to create rules of decision
based solely on a claim of inherent authority. 5 By enacted law, I
refer to authoritative sources of law other than the court's own
rules of decision, the paradigmatic example being a statute. For
purposes of the present discussion, which focuses on the powers
Justices who did not join the Black opinion indicated that they were prepared to recog-
nize some kind of inherent executive power in at least some circumstances. See id. at
661-62 (Clark, J. concurring in the judgment); id. at 682-83; 7-8-710 (Vinson, C.J. joined
by Reed & Minton, J.J. dissenting). Thus, the actual lineup on whether the President
has a prerogative may have been: no - three votes; not here, elsewhere maybe - two
votes; yes - four votes. Notwithstanding the ambiguities over whether the reasoning of
Justice Black's opinion in fact commanded a full majority, it has become conventional to
view the Steel Seizure Case as having rejected the idea of an executive prerogative. See
David Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sue. CT. REV. 19, 25-26;
cf. Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74
ViR. L. REV. 1253, 1264 & nn. 58-59 (1988) (stating that most commentators believe
"some realm of inherent authority in domestic matters exists" although Krent himself
disclaims the idea).
5. One can further distinguish between a "strong prerogative," which would permit
courts to formulate rules of decision on their own authority "against" the prescription of
enacted law, and a "weak prerogative," which would permit courts to adopt decisional
rules on their own authority only if not inconsistent with enacted law. The most promi-
nent argument in support of the former is found in GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). I will generally confine my observations to the weak
version, however, since this is the only version that has any prospect of being recognized
by the Supreme Court. Moreover, if the weak version violates separation of powers, then
a fortiori the strong version would be impermissible.
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of federal courts, I regard the U.S. Constitution, federal and
state statutes, and state common law rules as being enacted law.
In each case, the source of the rule of decision lies outside the
control of the federal court itself.
Previous writing on federal common law - including both
my own and Professor Martha Field's - has defined "federal
common law" broadly to include both prerogative law and judi-
cial lawmaking under the authority of enacted law.7 There are,
however, several reasons why it is important to distinguish be-
tween these two phenomena, and to focus initially on the judi-
cial prerogative rather than other arguable forms of federal com-
mon law.
First, whether there is a judicial prerogative has significant
implications for the scope of authority of federal courts. With
the prerogative, federal courts can make law whenever they be-
lieve "federal interests" justify their doing so,8 or whenever they
believe it is necessary to decide a case properly within their ju-
risdiction.' Without the prerogative, federal courts will have to
trace their authority to make law to some source in enacted law.
Notwithstanding the explosion in federal legislation that has
taken place in this century, there are still pockets of law un-
touched by enacted federal law (e.g., the standards for granting
a divorce). Thus, restricting federal courts to lawmaking under
the authority of enacted law would directly constrain their
powers.
Second, whether there is a judicial prerogative has an im-
portant bearing on how courts decide cases. There are a number
of Supreme Court decisions that adopt federal rules of decision
6. The distinction between judicial prerogative and enacted law is thus similar to
that between "natural law" and "positivism," at least insofar as positivism refers to rules
defined by "their pedigree or the manner in which they were adopted or developed,"
RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17 (1977), and therefore is understood to be
broad enough to include things like common law rules developed by some other judicial
system. See generally Fred Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J, 509 (1988); Steven Smith,
Why Should Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEO. L. J. 113 (1988).
7. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 890-899 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1985); see also Peter Westen and Jeffrey Leh-
man, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV, 311 (1980).
8. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 813 (1989).
9. See Steven Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case, 1985 U.
ILL. L. REV. 573.
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in areas touched by enacted federal law, without making any at-
tempt to derive the authority for the rule from the enacted law.
Instead, they justify the creation of a federal common law rule
based on its utility.10 The rationales of these decisions, to use
Locke's words, are grounded in the Court's perception of the
"public good," not the "prescription of law." If there is no judi-
cial prerogative they would have to be regarded as illegitimate.'
Third, if we conclude that there is no prerogative, then the
debate over federal common law is radically simplified: it is a
debate over what is legitimate in the name of interpretation of
enacted law. To be sure, this still includes a wide range of pos-
sibilities. At one extreme, you would have the position that fed-
eral courts must limit themselves to enforcing the specific inten-
tions of the drafters of enacted law. 2 At the other extreme, you
would have the position of Professor Field - joined now by
Professor Larry Kramer - that once Congress has legislated in
an area, federal courts are free to make law in that area so long
as it is not inconsistent with the statute.'3 My own position,
which I have spelled out more fully elsewhere, " is intermediate
between these two positions: I would permit federal courts to go
beyond conventional interpretation and make law in the com-
mon law mode provided they can show either that Congress has
10. I would include here cases like Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363, 367 (1943); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
11. Professor Field suggests that most of the opinions in these cases could be re-
written so as to trace the authority to create a federal rule of decision from enacted law.
See Field, supra note 7, at 906, 946. Since I do not share her extremely casual attitude
toward what constitutes legitimate interpretation, I do not fully agree with this. But
even if the only consequence of rejecting the prerogative were to require that judicial
opinions be written differently, that would be a not inconsequential conclusion.
12. This, for example, is the implicit view of the judicial role that underlies Chev-
ron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 845 (1984). See
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1000-
1001 (1992).
13. Field, supra note 7, at 893 (stating that in formulating rules of federal common
law, "the judiciary chooses the 'best rule' based on its own notions of policy and upon
whatever policies it finds implicit in the constitutional and statutory provisions it does
have an obligation to follow"); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal
Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev. 263, 289 (1992) ("federal courts can make common law ... so
long as whatever rules the courts fashion are consistent with and further an underlying
federal enactment").
14. Merrill, supra note 7.
[Vol. 12:327
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enacted law delegating lawmaking powers to courts, or that it is
necessary to replace state with federal law in order to preserve a
provision of enacted law. However, notwithstanding the wide
range of options available in the name of "interpretation," at
least the issue would be joined on common ground, and it would
be incumbent on the partisans of an expansive view of judicial
lawmaking power to explain how their position can be squared
with ordinary understandings of what constitutes interpretation
of legal texts.
In my previous article, I identified four "norms of legiti-
macy" that constrain federal courts in creating new federal rules
of decision: federalism, separation of powers, electoral accounta-
bility, and the Rules of Decision Act.'5 I portrayed these four
norms as mutually reinforcing, and as combining to form a
larger understanding that federal courts may not adopt rules of
decision that have not been at least implicitly authorized by en-
acted law. I continue to believe that each of these norms is rele-
vant to any inquiry into the legitimacy of judicial prerogative,
and that the case against an inherent power of judicial lawmak-
ing is stronger when all four constraints are considered in con-
junction than when any one is examined in isolation.
I will use this occasion, however, to focus more specifically
on the separation-of-powers norm. One reason for concentrating
on separation of powers is that today's Supreme Court takes
separation of powers more seriously than any of the other struc-
tural principles.'" The Court would at least give respectful atten-
tion to a separation of powers argument about the judicial pre-
rogative; whether it would even listen to a plea based on the
other constraints, such as the Rules of Decision Act, is more
doubtful.' 7 The other reason for focussing on separatiop of pow-
15. Merrill, supra note 7, at 12-32.
16. See, e.g., Washington Metropolitan Airports Auth v. Citizens to Prevent Abate-
ment, 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983). Even when the Court rejects arguments grounded in separation of pow-
ers theory, it strongly reaffirms the idea of separation of powers as a limiting principle.
See, e.g., Freitag v. CIR, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2634 (1991); Mistretta v United States, 488 U.S.
361, 380 (1989).
17. I say this notwithstanding my colleague Marty Redish's recent effort to rehabili-
tate the Rules of Decision Act. See Martin Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Le-
gitimacy, and the Interpretative Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U.
L. REV. 761 (1989). The Court's principal response to the Rule of Decision Act in recent
19921
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ers is that there is clearly more to say - on both sides of the
question - than I suggested in my previous article.
II.
The Constitution contains a number of provisions that call
into question what I have called the judicial prerogative. None
of these provisions establishes an ironclad argument against the
prerogative. If there were such an argument, the matter would
not be the subject of continuing debate. Still, I think the cumu-
lative effect of these provisions is sufficient at least to tilt the
balance strongly toward the anti-prerogative viewpoint.
Perhaps the first and most plausible place to look for guid-
ance about the lawmaking powers of federal courts is the divi-
sion of powers between the three constitutional branches of gov-
ernment. The Vesting Clause of Article I of the Constitution
provides that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States."'" When this lan-
guage is contrasted with the parallel Clause of Article III, stating
that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish,"'' it would seem
that whatever else may be included in the "judicial power," it
cannot include the power "to legislate," because "all" legislative
power has been given to Congress. Thus, if the judicial preroga-
tive - a discretionary power to make rules of decision based on
the court's assessment of the public good - is plausibly re-
garded as a species of the "legislative power," it would be seem
to be prohibited by the language of Article I § 1. A very similar
argument was endorsed by Justice Black's opinion in the Steel
Seizure Case in support of the conclusion that the President has
no power to "make law" under the Constitution.20
years has been to ignore it. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
20. 343 U.S. at 587-88. Justice Black's rejection of the executive prerogative in the
Steel Seizure Case presupposes that the Vesting Clause of Article I confers an exclusive
power to make law (not just statutes) on the Congress. This construction logically should
mean that the judiciary is also barred from performing such a function. On the other
hand, there is a textual basis for distinguishing the executive from the judicial preroga-
[Vol. 12:327
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The division-of-powers argument is not necessarily disposi-
tive, however. The problem is that the term "legislative power"
is ambiguous. It could mean, as Justice Black assumed, the
power to "make law." But it could also mean the power to
"make statutes" (or their functional equivalent).2" On the latter
reading, the Vesting Clause of Article I would establish an exclu-
sive grant of the power to Congress to act as the federal statute-
maker, but would not have anything to say about the power of
either the President or the federal judiciary to engage in other
forms of discretionary lawmaking (such as elaboration of com-
mon law norms). Years ago, Professor Corwin recognized this
possibility with respect to the powers of Congress and the Presi-
dent." He urged that the President be deemed to have discre-
tionary authority to act for the nation in default of legislation by
Congress, i.e., an executive prerogative. Congress could then re-
spond to the President's discretionary action with legislation,
which the President would be obliged to follow under the
Supremacy Clause." But unless or until Congress responded by
statute, the President could continue to define public policy for
the Nation.
The same interpretative options are presented by the re-
spective powers of the Congress and the federal judiciary. If the
"legislative power" refers only to the power to make statutes,
then the "judicial power" might include the discretionary power
to adopt rules of decision in default of Congress, subject to over-
ride by congressional legislation. But if the "legislative power"
means the power to "make law" more broadly, then courts
would have no purely discretionary power to act in default of
tive. Article II specifically provides that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art II § 3. Justice Black also relied on this provision,
noting that "the President's power to see that the law are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker." 343 U.S. at 587. Significantly, no analogous duty is
expressly imposed on federal courts in Article III. Thus, the absence of any Take Care
Clause for the judiciary might provide a basis for recognizing the judicial prerogative,
even if the Supreme Court has rejected any such power for the executive.
21. That is to say, "[elvery Order, Resolution, or Vote to Which the Concurrence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives" are necessary. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 7,
cl. 3.
22. Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1953).
23. See infra note 31 [quoting the Clause].
1992]
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enacted law. On this view, courts could engage in "lawmaking"
only if the power given to Congress is delegable (which it is), 24
and only if it has in fact been delegated to the federal courts
pursuant to enacted law. Decisions of the Supreme Court such
as the Steel Seizure Case suggest that the broad, "law-making"
reading of the legislative power is the correct one,2 5 but as an
original matter neither the text nor the history of the Constitu-
tion supply a definitive answer.26
Another basis for questioning the prerogative is that the
24. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (Congress has broad
power to delegate discretionary authority to entity located in the judicial branch); J.W.
Hampton, Jr. Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (Congress may confer broad
discretion on executive or judicial branches as long as it lays down an "intelligible princi-
ple" to follow).
25. The nondelegation cases, see supra note 24, also support this conclusion. In
holding that executive agencies and courts can exercise discretionary authority only if
Congress has laid down an "intelligible principle" to follow, the doctrine presupposes
that it is a constitutional requirement, derived from Art. I § 1, that governmental actors
other than Congress can make law only if authorized to do so by Congress. There are
numerous statements from the Supreme Court in a variety of contexts that equate the
"legislative power" with the power to "make law." See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447, 488 (1929) ("[t]o the legislative department has been committed the duty
of making laws"); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
26. The critical word "all" was added to the Vesting Clause of Article I late in the
Convention, by the Committee on Style. The previous draft submitted by the Committee
on Detail spoke only of "the legislative power." D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 423, 428 (1990). There is no record indicating that this
change generated any discussion, or that the Convention attributed any significance to
the new wording. Similarly, the potential significance of the word "all" goes largely Un-
remarked in the ratifying conventions and early commentaries on the Constitution.
There are two other arguments for not taking the use of the word "all" in the Vest-
ing Clause very seriously. First, it is arguably inconsistent with other provisions in the
Constitution. The Constitution quite explicitly gives the President an institutional role
in the process of producing statutes. Any bill, to become law, must be presented to the
President for signature or veto, and if vetoed must be enacted by a two-thirds majority
in each House. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Moreover, the President is given the power to
"make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur," U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2, and treaties are regarded a part of the "Supreme Law of the Land." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, "all legislative Powers" granted by the Constitution (in either
the law-making or the statute-making sense) are not vested in the Congress.
Second, when read in conjunction with the Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III, it
may be that the "all" in Article I was intended only to underscore the words "herein
granted," as if to say: "only those powers herein granted" shall be vested in the Con-
gress. See Calabresi & Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. Rev. 1155 (1992). On this reading, Articles II and III would vest
general executive and judicial powers in the President and the courts respectively, but
Article I would vest only a list of enumerated legislative powers in Congress.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss2/5
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Framers very likely did not understand the "judicial power" re-
ferred to in the Vesting Clause of Article III to include a power
to "make law" in a discretionary fashion. As Justice Scalia has
recently argued:
'The judicial Power of the United States' conferred upon this
Court and such inferior courts as Congress may establish must be
deemed to be the judicial power as understood by our common-
law tradition. That is the power 'to say what the law is,' not the
power to change it. I am not so naive (nor do I think our fore-
bears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make'
law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as
though they were 'finding' it - discerning what the law is,
rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will
tomorrow be.2"
In other words, the original understanding was that courts would
be law-finders not law-makers. This understanding, the argu-
ment goes, is inconsistent with the judicial prerogative.
Justice Scalia is surely correct that the "judicial power" was
thought by the Framers to include the authority to ascertain and
enforce the common law."' And he is also correct that the re-
ceived understanding of the common law method in the late
eighteenth century was one of "discovery" rather than "crea-
tion."2 9 But it does not inevitably follow (as Justice Scalia ap-
27. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2450-51 (1991) (con-
curring opinion) (citations omitted).
28. See George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie - the Implication Doctrine's Im-
plications for the Nature and Role of Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L. REv. 617, 623 (1984);
Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1515-16 (1969).
29. According to Professor Morton Horwitz:
In eighteenth century America, common law rules were not regarded as instru-
ments of social change; whatever legal change took place generally was brought
about through legislation. During this period, the common law was conceived of as
a body of essentially fixed doctrine to be applied in order to achieve a fair result
between private litigants in individual cases.
M. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 1 (1977). Even sophisti-
cated commentators of the day who acknowledged that the common law did change nev-
ertheless viewed such changes as reflecting evolving social custom, not as resting on al-
tered perceptions by judges of correct social policy. This understanding is reflected, for
example, in James Wilson's Lectures on Law, delivered in 1791:
It is the characteristick of a system of common law, that it be accommodated to
the circumstances, the exigencies, and the conveniences of the people, by whom it
is appointed. Now, as these circumstances, and exigencies, and conveniences in-
sensibly change; a proportioned change, in time and in degree, must take place in
19921
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
pears to believe) that it is unconstitutional for modern federal
courts to engage in free-wheeling creation of new common-law
norms. It all depends on the level of generality at which the
Framers understood the meaning of "the judicial power." They
may have understood that phrase at a very high level of general-
ity - as simply the power to decide cases. Or they may have
understood it at a more detailed level, as including the power to
decide cases under common law, but without having any speci-
fied understanding of common law method. Or they may have
understood it at an even more detailed level as encompassing
the power to decide cases under common law in the law-finding
manner of 18th century common law courts. In principle
originalist sources might tell us what level of generality was in-
tended,30 but as is often the case the historical record is too thin
to provide a definitive answer. Statements at the time of the
founding that presuppose a law-finding judiciary do not necessa-
rily mean the Framers understood that no other judicial role
would be permissible.
A further phrase in the Constitution that bears on the sub-
ject is the description of federal law that appears in the jurisdic-
tional grant of Article III and in similar form in the Supremacy
Clause. In both places, the Constitution describes federal law as
that which arises under "this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority."'3 It can be argued that each of the refer-
enced sources - the Constitution, federal statutes, and trea-
ties - is a form of enacted law. If this is the proper reading,
then the inference can be drawn that the Constitution equates
federal law with enacted law. The Constitution on this reading
the accommodated system. But though the system suffer these partial and succes-
sive alterations, yet it continues materially and substantially the same. The ship
of the Argonauts became not another vessel, though almost every part of her
materials had been altered during the course of her voyage.
1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 353 (McCloskey, ed. 1967).
30. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 148-150 (1990); Michael Perry,
The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VIE. L.
REv. 669, 678-79 (1991).31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." Art. VI, cl. 2.
[Vol. 12:327
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would make no provision for federal court jurisdiction over cases
arising under prerogative law, and more importantly, would pro-
vide no basis for finding that such law is the "supreme Law of
the Land." Although these defects would not necessarily rule out
all federal common law - one could still have federal common
law of the Swift v. Tyson 31 variety - they would weigh heavily
against construing the Constitution to permit the judicial
prerogative.
Although I find the suggestion that the Constitution equates
federal law with enacted law highly plausible,"3 it has been re-
jected by the Supreme Court. In particular, the Court has held
that the "laws" referred to include federal common law rules of
decision,' both for jurisdictional and Supremacy Clause pur-
poses.-" The word is probably sufficiently ambiguous to admit of
such a construction, and thus again it cannot be said that the
language of the jurisdictional grant and the Supremacy Clause
necessarily must be read as precluding the judicial prerogative.
Finally, there is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The exact meaning of the Clause has long been de-
bated, but at the minimum it can be read as adopting the princi-
ple that no one may be deprived of life, liberty or property by a
federal officer except in accordance with the law of the land. 5 In
32. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
33. The key question is whether "laws" means "statutes." An earlier draft of Article
III was unambiguous, providing that the judicial power would extend to "cases arising
under laws passed by the legislature of the United States." See CHARLES WARREN, THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 538-39 (1928). Whether the Framers changed the language
to broaden the grant of jurisdiction, or simply as a matter of style, is unknown.
34. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 850 (1985); Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1972). Cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1939) (construing "laws" of the states in the Rules of Decision Act to include com-
mon law decisions).
35. Sir Edward Coke, a commentator familiar to the Framers, equated "due process
of law" with the "per legem terre" language of Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta. EDWARD
COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (1797 ed.). Al-
though recent scholarship has called this interpretation into question, see Keith Jurow,
Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 19 AM L.
LEGAL HIST. 265 (1975), there is no reason to think that the Framers did not accept
Coke's equation of the two ideas. See, e.g., Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States 663 (1833) (Due Process Clause "is but an enlargement of the
language of magna carta"). See generally Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S.
Ct. 1032, 1049 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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other words, at the very least the Clause guarantees the rule of
law: the federal government may impinge on private rights only
in accordance with fixed general principles knowable in advance.
The judicial prerogative is arguably inconsistent with such a
guarantee, for it contemplates that one class of federal of-
ficers - federal judges - has a discretionary power to take
life, liberty and property in accordance with new rules of deci-
sion announced and applied for the first time to the case at
hand. 6
Although I find the proposed construction of due process
appealing, I must admit that it has not been squarely endorsed
by the Supreme Court. There are some tantalizing suggestions:
for example, the Court's recent punitive damages deci-
sion - which says that due process prohibits courts from set-
ting damage awards without "a sufficiently definite and mean-
ingful constraint" on their discretion, 7 and the strong trend
toward rejecting prospective overrulings of prior judicial deci-
sions because of the "legislative" overtones of such a practice.38
But, again, I cannot maintain that the Due Process Clause nec-
essarily must be read as precluding the kind of discretionary ju-
dicial lawmaking contemplated by the judicial prerogative.
The clause-by-clause quest -for an answer to the legitimacy
of the judicial prerogative is therefore inconclusive. But proceed-
ing in this fashion risks obscuring the big picture. For one thing,
there is the cumulative effect of the clause-specific arguments.
Standing alone, none is dispositive. Taken together, they consti-
tute a far more compelling case that there is something anoma-
lous about the prerogative.
In addition, the clause-by-clause approach overlooks what
may be one the most salient aspects of our Constitution - its
aspiration to subordinate all of government to written law. The
36. Similarly, Justice Jackson argued in his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure
Case that the proper reading of the Take Care Clause, when read in conjunction with the
Due Process Clause, is that "ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we
submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules." 343 U.S. at 646.
37. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1045 (1991).
38. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991) (holding
that civil rule applied to one party should be applied to all others pending on direct
review); Griffin v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (adopting rule of retroactive application
in all criminal cases pending on direct review); cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)
(new rules do not relate back to convictions challenged on habeas corpus).
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idea plays a powerful role in our tradition. It is the cornerstone
of Marbury v. Madison 9 and the institution of judicial review.
It shows up in the modern era in the strong presumption in
favor of judicial review of the constitutionality of executive ac-
tion. 0 Indeed, we have come to associate the judiciary very
closely with the idea that ours is a government subject to the
constraints of written law. Given this understanding, it would be
ironic, to put it mildly, to discover that the judiciary itself en-
joys an inherent power to make rules of law not traceable to any
provision of written law. It is true that the Framers failed to
anticipate this precise point. But then, they failed to spell out
the power of judicial review and the presumption of reviewabil-
ity too. In each case, the most basic implications of the docu-
ment have revealed themselves only with time. That does not
mean, however, that the understanding is any less fundamental
to American constitutionalism, or less fatal to the idea of the
judicial prerogative.
III.
When we turn from the Constitution itself to the Supreme
Court's decisions construing it, I think the same general lesson
can be drawn. There are opinions that appear to reject the pre-
rogative,"1 and opinions that cannot be explained on any basis
other than the existence of the prerogative.42 But the better
judgment - the judgment reached at critical junctures in our
history when the full implications of the question were most
clearly revealed - has been to reject the idea of the judicial
prerogative as being inconsistent with the precepts of constitu-
tional government.
A.
Professor Bruce Ackerman has popularized the idea of "con-
stitutional moments," i.e., important turning points in our his-
tory when the received understanding of the Constitution has
39. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
40. E.g., Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2053 (1988).
41. See, e.g., Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41
(1981).
42. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 488 U.S. 500 (1988).
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undergone a significant transformation or clarification. 3 By
analogy, there are two such "moments" that bear directly on the
issue of the judicial prerogative.
The first occurred as part of a great national debate over
the Sedition Act of 1798.44 The federal Constitution, as univer-
sally understood in the 1790's, did not contain an enumerated
power that authorized Congress to enact the Sedition Act. The
Federalists' argument in support of its constitutionality was as
follows: seditious libel was a crime at common law; the federal
courts have an inherent power to try common law crimes;45
therefore Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, has
the power to revise (and in fact "liberalize") the common law
crime of seditious libel. The Federalist case for the Sedition Act,
in other words, depended on recognizing something very much
like what I have called the judicial prerogative. Public outcry
against this theory was an important element in the elections of
1800 and 1804, and contributed to the sweeping victories of the
Jeffersonian Party over the Federalists in those years.
The outcome at the ballot box dictated the outcome when
the issue of an inherent judicial power to try common law crimes
finally came before the Supreme Court in United States v. Hud-
son & Goodwin." Justice Johnson (a Jefferson appointee) an-
nounced that "[a]lthough this question is brought up now for
the first time to be decided by this Court, we consider it as hav-
ing been long since settled in public opinion. '4 7 Reasoning from
both federalism and separation of powers premises, Johnson an-
nounced that before the coercive power of the federal govern-
ment may be brought to bear on an individual, "[t]he legislative
43. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 17, 22 (1991); Ackerman,
The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1055-56 (1984).
44. For general background, see 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 766-784 (1953); Stewart Jay, The Origins of Federal
Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1985).
45. There were in fact numerous Federalist-inspired common law criminal prosecu-
tions in the federal courts in the first two decades after the adoption of the Constitution.
See STEPHEN PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS
AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE ch. 6 (1991).
46. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). See generally Note, The Sound of Silence: United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Fed-
eral Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 925-30 (1992).
47. Hudson, 11 U.S. at 32.
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authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a
punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdic-
tion of the offence."4 When Hudson was reaffirmed four years
later in United States v. Coolidge,49 this time outside the con-
text of seditious libel, the idea of an inherent federal judicial
power to try common law crimes passed into history, never to be
seriously asserted again. 0
If Hudson and Coolidge mark a constitutional moment, just
how momentous was it? There is language in the Hudson opin-
ion that could easily be taken as rejecting any federal judicial
prerogative. 1 And indeed there are indications that this was the
general understanding throughout the nineteenth century.2
Hudson itself, however, has come to be treated as precluding the
use of judicial prerogative only in the context of common law
48. Id. at 34.
49. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
50. Coolidge revealed that there were in fact continuing divisions in the Court over
the issue, but also that the faction favoring federal common law crimes was unable to
muster the support to obtain a decision validating the idea. After failing to secure legis-
lation conferring a common law criminal jurisdiction on the Circuit Courts, Justice Story,
as Circuit Justice in Massachusetts, held that, notwithstanding Hudson, federal courts
sitting in admiralty had inherent authority to punish common law offenses against the
authority of the United States. United States v. Coolidge, 25 F.Cas. 619 (C.C.D. Mass.
(1813). On appeal, Justice Johnson indicated that the members of the Supreme Court
were divided on the question. But because the Attorney General declined to argue the
cause (he deemed Hudson controlling), and because no counsel appeared for the defend-
ant, Johnson indicated that the Court "would not chose to review their former decision
in the case of United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, or draw it into doubt." 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) at 416. After that, the Court never revisited the issue.
51. See, e.g., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33: "It is not necessary to inquire whether the
general Government, in any and what extent, possesses the power of conferring on its
Courts a jurisdiction in cases similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction
has not been conferred by any legislative act, if it does not result to those Courts as a
consequence of their creation."
52. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 591, 658 (1834) ("It is clear,
there can be no common law of the United States . . . . There is no principle which
pervades the union and has the authority of law, that is not embodied in the constitution
or laws of the union."); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888) ("There is no com-
mon law of the United States, in the sense of a national customary law, distinct from the
common law of England as adopted by the several States each for itself, applied as its
local law, and subject to such alternation as may be provided by its own statutes.");
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92, 101 (1901) ("There is no body of
Federal common law separate and distinct from the common law existing in the several
States in the sense that there is a body of statute law enacted by Congress separate and
distinct from the body of state law enacted by the several States.").
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crimes. One reason why the decision can be read this narrowly is
that it cast the prerogative issue largely in terms of jurisdic-
tion. 3 The opinion can thus be read as establishing that federal
courts must trace their jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case from enacted law, but as not foreclosing the exercise of
.prerogative to formulate rules of decision in cases where juris-
diction has otherwise been established. This means, for example,
that it was possible to read Hudson has not foreclosing the exer-
cise of the prerogative where federal court have an independent
basis for jurisdiction, as in admiralty or diversity cases.
The second "constitutional moment" occurred over one
hundred years later, when the Court laid to rest any exercise of
judicial prerogative to formulate rules of decision in diversity
cases. There can be little doubt that Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
54
was a transformative event.55 It rendered irrelevant thousands of
decisions in the federal reports, reoriented our understanding of
the relationship between federal courts and states courts, per-
manently transformed the nature of legal practice in what was
then the largest area of federal court jurisdiction, and estab-
lished a scholarly agenda for an entire generation of legal
academics."
Like Hudson, Erie contains some very broad language that
could be taken as disposing of the prerogative issue once and for
all:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of
the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by
its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is
not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general com-
mon law.57
Again, however, the language has not been read for all it is
worth. Just as Hudson has been implicitly limited to the com-
mon law of crimes, Erie has essentially been limited to diversity
53. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33-34.
54. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
55. Ackerman himself has described the decision as "a star of the first magnitude in
the legal universe." BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 272 n. 4
(1977).
56. Id. at 169.
57. 304 U.S. at 78.
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cases. Indeed, Erie is now widely regarded by both the Court
and commentators as a decision about the evils of "forum shop-
ping" in diversity cases, rather than a decision about the limits
of federal judicial power. 8
The failure to read Erie broadly can also be explained in
part by its rationale. Erie articulated the constitutional case
against the prerogative exclusively in terms of federalism. The
Court stressed that "Congress has no power to declare substan-
tive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be
local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a
part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution pur-
ports to confer such a power upon the federal courts."59 Thus,
the previous doctrine of Swift v. Tyson "invaded rights which in
our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several
States."60
Erie's focus on federalism may in turn explain the rise of the
so-called "new federal common law."'" In some post-Erie cases
like Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States," the Court seemed to
be operating on the assumption that federal courts can exercise
common law powers in any area that has been visited by con-
gressional legislation. If Erie is just a case about federalism, this
would make sense: the fact that Congress has constitutionally
legislated in an area establishes that there is no federalism prob-
lem, and there being no federalism problem, there is no Erie
problem.
As it turned out, therefore, both constitutional moments
were read more narrowly than they had to be. Still, there can be
no denying the significance of these decisions. At the very least,
after Hudson and Erie - and the settled understanding they
58. The process of recasting Erie as a decision about the need for parity between
federal and state courts began in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487
(1941) and was solidified by Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Modern
scholarship has tended to dwell on the same concerns. See John H. Ely, The Irrepressi-
ble Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974); Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips,
Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 356 (1977).
59. 304 U.S. 78.
60. Id. at 80.
61. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964).
62. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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reflect - the dispute over the judicial prerogative has been
roped off in an area that excludes (1) criminal cases, (2) diver-
sity cases, and (3) cases dealing with questions outside the enu-
merated powers of Congress. More broadly, given the watershed
nature of these decisions, and the unqualified terms in which
they condemn the judicial prerogative, there can be little doubt
that they have placed the pro-prerogative forces on the
defensive.
Not surprisingly, therefore, although the record of the post-
Erie years is mixed, there is overall a distinctly apologetic tone
to the scattered decisions that recognize some form of the pre-
rogative. The Court has cautioned that federal courts "are not
general common-law courts and do not possess a general power
to develop and apply their own rules of decision," 3 that federal
common law applies only in "some limited areas," ' and that
those areas are "few and restricted."6 The words "federal com-
mon law" are often placed in quotation marks, or prefixed with
the modifier "so called."661 When the Court does have recourse to
federal common law, it often "adopts" state law as the rule of
decision (thereby minimizing the impact of federal common
law). 7 And the Court has announced that the standard for de-
termining whether congressional legislation displaces federal
common law is much more lenient than the standard for deter-
mining federal preemption of state law. All-in-all, there is a
sense of unease about the decisions adopting federal common
law, verging on guilt. The tone of these decisions, if not always
the outcome, suggests that there is something anomalous about
federal common law, and that it fits uncomfortably within the
general jurisprudential assumptions about the role of federal
courts under the Constitution.
Finally, as a kind of counterpoise to the persistence of the
"new federal common law," the Court has begun to question the
legitimacy of federal judicial lawmaking in certain areas not tra-
63. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981).
64. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
65. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
66. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2514 (1988); Wallis v.
Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 64 (1966).
67. E.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
68. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314-17 (1981).
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ditionally regarded as presenting a federal common law ques-
tion. Most prominent here are decisions adopting a more restric-
tive attitude toward judicial implication of private rights of
action, with some Justices suggesting that the practice of adopt-
ing private rights of action without a clear congressional direc-
tive violates separation of powers." Commentators have dubbed
this development the "New Erie" doctrine.7"
B.
Against the evidence drawn from Hudson and Erie, the con-
tinuing grudging attitude toward federal common law, and the
rise of the "New Erie" separation of powers thesis, there stand
three contrary elements in our institutional practice: the use of
federal common law to resolve interstate disputes, the use of
federal common law in suits in admiralty, and the exercise of
common law powers by the state courts, which like their federal
cousins operate within a system of government organized on
principles of separation of powers. In each of the three named
areas courts formulate decisional rules in the common law mode;
in each they exercise considerable discretion in the formulation
of policy, subject only to the limits imposed by stare decisis.
Can the use of common law decisionmaking in these areas be
reconciled with a more general understanding that separation of
powers restricts courts to acting under the authority of enacted
law?
Perhaps. The first thing I would note is that what we wit-
ness in each of these areas today - the exercise of prerogative-
like judicial powers - was not perceived that way when the ju-
dicial role was first inaugurated. In the world of the late eight-
eenth century and early nineteenth century, interstate disputes
were resolved according to established principles of international
law;"' admiralty disputes were resolved under the general mari-
69. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J. concur-
ring); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979) (Powell, J.
dissenting).
70. See Donald Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 1990
UTAH L. REV. 759; Brown, supra note 28.
71. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838) (interstate
boundary dispute).
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time law;72 and state common law disputes were adjudicated
under the common law of England and such English statutes as
had been adopted by the state legislatures. In each case, the
courts saw their task as "discovering" the law reflected in settled
custom or precedent. Over time, with the triumph of Legal Real-
ism and the Erie decision, courts came to see their function in
these areas as one of contributing to an evolving judge-made ju-
risprudence, that is, as more prerogative-like. But by then, the
primacy of common-law making was so well established in each
area that its legitimacy was beyond challenge. To a considerable
extent then, the use of prerogative-like powers in these areas
does not call into question a more general understanding that
federal courts are limited to authority given by enacted law.
Moreover, the apparent paradox that "state common law
has a legitimacy in cases like MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
that federal common law lacks in cases like Illinois v. Milwau-
kee" 3 has a direct positivist explanation: state courts exercise a
general common law jurisdiction because state statutes author-
ize them to do so. When the colonies broke away from England,
there was considerable uncertainly about what impact this had
on the laws theretofore enforced by the colonial courts. The so-
lution was to enact state statutes "receiving" the common law of
England (and often certain general statutes of England modify-
ing the common law) as the rule of decision for the State.7" Simi-
lar statutes were then adopted for the territories and the newer
States as they were admitted to the Union. A typical example,
still in force today, is the following statute of Illinois:
The common law of England, so far as the same is applicable and
of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of the British parlia-
ment made in aid of and to supply the defects of the common
law, prior to the fourth year of James the First, excepting the
second section of the sixth chapter of 43d Elizabeth, the eighth
chapter of 13th Elizabeth, and the ninth chapter of 27th Henry
72. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 571-78 (1874).
73. Weinberg, supra note 8, at 806.
74. See E. BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836 25-26 (1964) (ta-
ble summarizing initial receiving laws); Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of
its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951). Apparently only Con-
necticut of the original colonies left it to the courts themselves to declare the continuing
force of the common law. Id. at 800.
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Eighth, and which are of a general nature and not local to that
kingdom, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as
of full force until repealed by legislative authority.75
These receiving statutes thus represent an example of what
I have called "delegated lawmaking": 76 the state legislature has
transferred discretionary authority to the state courts to exercise
a defined common law jurisdiction, specifically, a general juris-
diction building on the common law of England. Given this stat-
utory authority, the exercise of a general common law jurisdic-
tion by state courts does not call into question the thesis that
separation of powers prohibits the exercise of judicial preroga-
tive by federal courts.
The use of federal common law in admiralty cases and in-
terstate disputes is harder to reconcile with an anti-prerogative
framework. The problem in each case was that, with some ex-
ceptions, federal courts had been given exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve these disputes,77 but neither the Constitution nor Con-
gress had the foresight to give them a corresponding grant of
authority to adopt preemptive decisional rules. In the case of
interstate disputes, the power to issue judgments preemptive of
state law was clearly required in order to keep the grant of juris-
diction from becoming a dead letter. The Supreme Court could
not effectively resolve a boundary dispute between two States if
the States were free to turn around and adopt legislation man-
dating a contrary disposition. 718 In the case of admiralty jurisdic-
tion, the federal courts could continue to function if the States
had a revisionary power, but the whole point of granting exclu-
sive jurisdiction to the federal courts was to insure a single uni-
form jurisprudence in an area central to foreign and interstate
commerce, and this purpose would be frustrated by divergent
75. Ill Ann. Stat. ch. 1 § 801.
76. Merrill, supra note 7, at 40-46.
77. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the district courts "exclusive original
cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." 1 Stat. 77 (1789).
This exclusive jurisdiction continues to this day. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Section 13 of the
Act, following Art. III, § 2, cl. 2, gave the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction "of all
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its
citizens." 1 Stat. 80 (1789). The current version is at 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
78. See Field, supra note 7, at 916.
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state law.79
Although it took many decades for the Court to perceive the
full implications of the situation, in both areas it eventually con-
strued the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to contain within it an
implicit grant of power to formulate decisional rules in the com-
mon law manner, which rules could not be altered by the
states.8 0 Implicit delegation of lawmaking authority is obviously
less satisfactory under an anti-prerogative framework than is ex-
plicit delegation. Nevertheless, as long as it is confined to the
circumstances where (1) the Constitution or a federal statute
confers exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts and (2) the exer-
cise of revisionary powers by the States would either nullify the
grant of jurisdiction or undermine its very reason for being, per-
79. See David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess",
1960 Sup. CT. REV. 158, 159-64.
80. On the admiralty side, the key steps were (1) the determination that congres-
sional power to revise general maritime law is not limited by the Commerce Clause, but
is coextensive with the grant of exclusive maritime jurisdiction to the federal courts,
Butler v. Boston and Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U.S. 527, 557 (1889); In re Garrett,
141 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1891); Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924); (2) the
holding that state statutes dealing with maritime matters are invalid if they "work[]
material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law" as declared
by the federal courts, Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917); and (3) the determination that the
preemptive force of federally-declared maritime law was not affected by Erie, see Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 411 (1953). After the fact, the Court was able to say
"We consistently have interpreted the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal
courts as a proper basis for the development of judge-made rules of maritime law."
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1981).
On the interstate dispute side, the law developed largely in suits between States over
boundary and water apportionment issues, where the Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction. These disputes tended to be intensely factual and often involved the con-
struction of interstate compacts. Not surprisingly, therefore, for the first century or so
the Court gave little attention to the precise source of law. See Connecticut v. Massachu-
setts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931) ("For the decision of suits between States, federal, state
and international law are considered and applied by this Court as the exigencies of the
particular case may require."). Well before Erie was decided, however, the Court recog-
nized that the law it applied in these cases could not be subject to revision by the States
that were parties before it. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95-98 (1907). And
in order to protect the law the Court applied in the original jurisdiction cases, it was
necessary to apply the same law when interstate disputes arose in cases involving private
parties. See, e.g., Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 295 (1918). Thus, in Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938), decided the same day
as Erie, the Court could cite extensive authority for the proposition that questions in-
volving the apportionment of an interstate stream were governed by "federal common
law."
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haps the practice in these areas can be accommodated to the
overall presuppositions of a system based on separation of
powers.
IV.
In addition to considerations based on text, precedent, and
institutional practice, several "functional" considerations are
relevant in trying to determine whether the judicial prerogative
can coexist with separation of powers. I shall consider first two
arguments that weigh against the prerogative, then an argument
that supports it.
A.
Article I of the Constitution establishes some important
procedural hurdles that must be surmounted before somebody's
good idea can become the law of the land. A bill must be ap-
proved within the same legislative session by both the House
and the Senate, and must then be presented to the President for
his approval. If the President vetoes the measure, then it must
be approved by two-thirds of the House and Senate, again
within the same legislative session. As the Supreme Court has
observed, "the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1,7
represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the
Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure."81 This "finely
wrought" procedure serves a number of purposes, including
slowing down the lawmaking process to insure adequate deliber-
ation, 2 raising the barriers to measures sponsored by factional
interests,83 protecting the constitutional functions of the Presi-
dent,84 and insuring that the interests of the States are fully
considered before state law is displaced by federal law. 5
If federal courts had a prerogative to make decisional rules
without congressional authorization, then they would short cir-
81. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
82. Id. at 947-48, 949-50.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 947.
85. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-52, 556
(1985).
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cuit the procedural hurdles to federal lawmaking erected by Ar-
ticle I. Federal law could be made without bicameral approval or
presentation to the President. Accordingly, none of the purposes
advanced by those procedures - promoting deliberation, frus-
trating factions, protecting the President, protecting the
States - would be served as well (if at all) by prerogative law.
Of course, the same criticism can be made of any lawmaking by
the executive agencies or the courts pursuant to power delegated
by Congress. But at least when agencies and courts make law
pursuant to authority conferred by enacted law, Congress and
the President have made the judgment - following the proce-
dures of Article I - that it is permissible to dispense with the
procedures of Article I. The judicial prerogative would allow the
courts to decide for themselves when to do the dispensing.
Article I's procedural requirements also provide the answer
to the oft-repeated notion that judicial prerogative presents no
separation of powers problem because Congress can always over-
ride judge-made law. 6 The judicial prerogative would allow
courts to evade the procedural barriers of Article I, lowering the
costs of making federal law. However, in order to undo the
judge-made law, Congress would still have to surmount those
barriers. Thus, recognizing a judicial prerogative would radically
alter what is in effect a bias against new federal law, and would
replace it with a bias against undoing (judge-made) federal law.
A second functional objection to the prerogative is that it
has no inherent limits. As Locke observed, "prerogative is noth-
ing but the power of doing public good without a rule." '87 For the
partisans of the federal judicial prerogative, the governing stan-
dard is equally breathtaking. For example, Professor Weinberg
says that in every case, "what justifies an exercise of national
lawmaking power is the existence of a legitimate national gov-
ernmental interest ... [N]o other 'authorization' is required."'88
But once it is asserted that a judicial finding of a legitimate
"federal interest" is sufficient to support judicial lawmaking,
what is to stop the federal courts from becoming the primary
86. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 92-93; Monaghan, The Supreme Court,
1974 Term - Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L REV. 1, 34 (1975).
87. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 202.
88. Weinberg, supra note 8, at 813.
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engine of policy formation? The partisans of the prerogative
have no answer to this question - except to appeal to the self
restraint of federal judges. Under a Constitution founded on the
principle that all unchecked power is to be regarded with suspi-
cion, this is not enough.
To be sure, even with the prerogative there would be con-
straints on the freedom of action of federal courts. Federal
courts are empowered to declare law only as an incident of their
power to decide "cases" and "controversies," and this constitu-
tional limitation works against judicial aggrandizement.8 9 More-
over, even if federal courts have inherent power to make law,
presumably they would not make law that contradicts existing
enacted law.9 0 But these constraints may be less meaningful
than often supposed. Expanded rules of standing, class actions,
and remedies give federal courts powers of institutional reform
unimaginable in the past." And since Congress generally does
not legislate against a background rule that assumes an inherent
judicial power to make law, such enacted law as exists will gen-
erally take a form that can be construed as an alternative source
of empowerment, rather than as a constraint on judicial
prerogative.
In looking for a meaningful source of constraint on judicial
power in the Constitution, the most plausible candidate is the
"law constraint." In other words, federal courts - like the ex-
ecutive branch - should be viewed as institutions that are
completely dependent on enacted law for their authority. With
this background understanding, enacted law becomes a source
both of empowerment and constraint. Enacted law supplies the
occasion for lawmaking, but also provides inherent limitations
on the exercise of that power. When the terms of the enacted
delegation run out, the power to make law runs out. The anti-
prerogative view thus supplies a way of holding the judicial
power, like the powers granted to the other branches of the na-
89. See generally Krent, supra note 4.
90. Unless, of course, one adopted the Calabresian "strong prerogative" position, see
supra note 5, in which case even this limit would not apply.
91. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (upholding district court
decree which, as modified, required local school district to raise taxes to pay for con-
struction of magnet schools of sufficient quality to stem "white flight").
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tional government, in check.92
B.
Against the foregoing functional considerations stands
Locke's justification for the prerogative - the argument from
necessity. Legislators, Locke argued, cannot "foresee and pro-
vide by laws for all that may be useful to the community ...
nay, many things there are which the law can by no means pro-
vide for, and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of
him that has the executive power in his hands. '93 In the context
of the judicial prerogative, as Professor Steven Smith has
pointed out, 4 the argument from necessity takes two quite dif-
ferent forms. One, which he calls the policy perspective, stresses
the need for the judicial prerogative in order to make sure that
important "federal interests" do not go unprotected because of
legislative inattention. 5 The other, which is based on the duty
of courts to decide cases, posits that the prerogative is necessary
in order to permit federal courts to reach a judgment in cases
properly before them when Congress has failed to provide a rule
of decision.9
In its policy form, the argument from necessity presents a
seeming paradox: it presupposes that it is meaningful to speak
of "federal interests" that are so strong they must be protected
by someone, and yet are so weak they have failed to secure the
92. The contributions of Professors Field and Kramer to this panel may be read
either as denying that there is a judicial prerogative, and then endorsing a very broad
conception of legal interpretation, or as endorsing the prerogative, subject to the limita-
tion that federal courts can make law only in areas where Congress has legislated. In
either event, the proposed limitation would provide virtually no constraint on federal
judicial lawmaking. It is hard to think of any area of human activity - from land use
planning to family life to funding for the arts - that has not been touched by federal
regulation and/or federal grants-in-aid. Thus, the suggestion that it would be necessary
to show that Congress has legislated in the area would amount to little more than a
pleading barrier before federal courts could take off on an unguided exercise formulating
new rules of decision based on perceptions of utility.
93. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 199; see also text at supra note 2.
94. See Smith, supra note 9.
95. Id. at 587-593. For a defense of what Smith would call the policy maker argu-
ment, see Weinberg, supra note 8. See also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the
Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 875 (1991).
96. Smith, supra note 9, at 581-82.
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protection of enacted law. As such, the argument raises some
rather large philosophical questions. To what extent do evalua-
tive statements like "this is a federal interest" reflect a meta-
physical reality that is "out there," independent of its embodi-
ment in enacted law? And what are the best methods for
ascertaining "federal interests" - moral argumentation (for
which read litigation) or the ballot box? Exploring these issues
would take me far beyond the confines of this paper. Suffice it to
say that my own instincts incline toward metaphysical skepti-
cism (at least about what constitutes a "federal interest") and
deference toward democratic procedures. That is to say, I view
"federal interests" as a social construct, the best measure of
which is enacted law. This does not mean that "federal inter-
ests" always reveal themselves in enacted law in a self evident
fashion; some strenuous interpretation may occasionally be re-
quired to tease them out. But to say this is different from buy-
ing into the proposition that federal courts have a direct pipe-
line into a reservoir of "federal interests" that have never
captured the allegiance of the elected branches of government.
The other necessity argument - based on the duty to de-
cide cases - raises more of an empirical question. Are the law-
making tools available to federal courts under the authority of
enacted law up to the task of deciding all cases properly within
their jurisdiction, or are they not? One cannot evaluate this ver-
sion of the necessity argument without exploring, at least in a
very summary way, the second issue posed by the general defini-
tion of "federal common law": What is legitimate in the name of
interpretation of enacted law? The wider the range of action
available to courts in interpreting and otherwise giving effect to
enacted law, the fewer will be the occasions when courts will find
they are stumped about how to answer a particular question
that must be resolved in order to decide a case properly before
them. Let me briefly mention a number of ways in which federal
courts can make law (and hence provide decisional rules for the
resolution of cases) consistent with the view that they must al-
ways act under the authority of enacted law.
First, the understanding that there is no judicial prerogative
applies only to the articulation of "rules of decision," that is,
rules that govern the "rights, duties and relations of persons"
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outside the judicial branch.9 7 Separation of powers principles
should not be regarded as precluding the exercise of prerogative
with respect to internal operating rules of the courts. Thus, for
example, federal courts should be regarded as having an inher-
ent power, in the absence of congressional intervention, to for-
mulate rules of procedure and evidence. 8 Similarly, they should
be regarded as having inherent authority to decide how to de-
cide, that is, to adopt rules of legal method for guiding the pro-
cess of interpreting enacted law. I would include under this
heading rules for the introduction and use of evidence of legisla-
tive intent (such as legislative history), canons of construction
that serve as default rules in the absence of adequate evidence
of legislative intent, and rules governing the treatment of prece-
dent, including not just judicial precedent but also the precedent
of relevant executive branch interpreters.9 The inherent author-
ity of courts to decide how to decide obviously introduces a sig-
nificant element of judicial discretion, and justifies the conclu-
sion that courts inevitably and rightly "make law" when they
seek to further legislative intent through interpretation of en-
acted law.
Second, consistent with the limitations of the nondelegation
doctrine, Congress may delegate discretionary authority to fed-
eral courts to formulate rules of decision. The delegation may be
either explicit or implicit. As discussed above, one form of im-
plicit delegation occurs when Congress confers exclusive jurisdic-
tion on federal courts in a context where allowing the states to
exercise a revisionary power would frustrate the purpose of the
jurisdictional grant. A more common form of implicit delegation
is when Congress enacts a statute containing broad language
that must be filled in by the courts through the process of case-
by-case adjudication, the federal antitrust laws being a prime
example.100 I would also include here cases where Congress
leaves an internal gap in a statute creating a federal cause of
97. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 463 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (Presentment and Bicameralism
Clauses apply only to rules affecting the rights, duties and relations of persons outside
the legislative branch).
98. See Merrill, supra note 7, at 46-47 & n. 200.
99. See Merrill, supra note 12, at 1003-1012.
100. Merrill, supra note 7, at 43-46 (discussing federal antitrust laws as a paradig-
matic form of delegated lawmaking).
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action, i.e., a gap that must be resolved in order to decide a case
which Congress has directed the courts to hear. In such cases,
the court should be regarded as having been delegated implicit
authority by the enacting statute to try to fill the gap in accor-
dance with congressional intent.
Third, courts have available two powerful tools that result
in the creation of new federal decisional rules by negating ex-
isting state rules. One is the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion, which allows federal courts to find that state law has been
preempted by federal law, again either explicitly or implicitly,
and must be replaced by a federal rule of decision. 10 1 The other
is the Commerce Clause, which has been interpreted as confer-
ring exclusive power on Congress to enact rules that discrimi-
nate against or impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.
Thus, state laws that discriminate or create undue burdens are
invalid unless expressly authorized by Congress.102
Cumulatively, the foregoing powers - each of which I be-
lieve can be reconciled with the anti-prerogative posi-
tion - should be sufficient to resolve most of the cases that to-
day fall under the rubric of "federal common law." In particular,
these doctrines legitimize a great deal of judicial "lawmaking,"
and yet they do so without losing sight of the touchstone of en-
acted law.
Furthermore, at least in the federal system, courts that can-
not resolve issues in terms of enacted federal law can always fall
back on state law. Indeed, the Rules of Decision Act - itself of
course enacted law - directs that state laws shall provide the
rule of decision in cases where they apply "except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide."10 3 Thus, because the federal
101. See, e.g., Hillsborough County Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985) (summarizing categories of implied preemption).
102. The idea that the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I 8, confers an exclusive
power on Congress over some, but not all, interstate commerce, was first clearly articu-
lated in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851). Although it is possible to question this interpretation as an original matter, see
Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 262
(1987) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting that the Constitution treats commerce "as a unitary
subject"), it is based on an interpretation of enacted law (the Constitution) that is too
well entrenched today to call into question.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
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courts operate against a backdrop of a separate system of law,
there is further reason to doubt that they need the prerogative
in order to fulfill their duty to decide cases. 104
V.
The debate over what I have called the judicial prerogative
has long been, and shows every sign of continuing to be, discon-
tinuous. The opponents of the prerogative talk the language of
legitimacy, demanding to know where the authority to make fed-
eral common law comes from, and what the limits of such a
power might be. The proponents of the prerogative talk the lan-
guage of utility, asking whether the world would be a better
place if federal courts could never make federal common law.
Obviously, it would be nice to find a solution that gave us both
legitimacy and utility, but I doubt that such a happy solution
exists.
My approach has been to start with the legitimacy perspec-
tive, and try to build some flexibility into it. This strategy, if it
remains true to the norms of legitimacy, must inevitably sacri-
fice utility in some cases. But at least it promises to rescue a fair
amount of what has been called federal common law, without
giving up on the idea that there are inherent constraints on judi-
cial power. The other approach, which would start with the util-
ity of giving federal judges a broad power to make law in default
of Congress, offers no inherent stopping place at all. Ultimately,
the only constraint on judicial lawmaking would be the public
perception of how good a job the judges are doing in governing
the nation.
Locke was aware of this. He pointed out that the "preroga-
tive was always largest in the hands of our wisest and best
princes" because the people observed "the whole tendency of
104. My colleague Gary Lawson has developed what is in effect another reason why
the duty to decide cases does not justify the prerogative: if the moving party cannot
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that enacted law supports his position, the
court can simply say "not proven" and dismiss the case. See Lawson, Proving the Law
(unpublished ms.). If we think of propositions of law as requiring a minimum degree of
proof, then the dismissal of party A's case for failure to prove the law would not "make
law" one way or the other for other cases, anymore than would dismissal of A's the case
for failing to prove the facts establish a precedent binding on future cases.
[Vol. 12:327
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss2/5
FEDERAL COURTS SYMPOSIUM
their actions to be the public good. 1 06 Those who today cry out
for the judicial prerogative seem to share a similar faith that
federal judges are "our wisest and best princes." Perhaps they
are correct in this assessment. But as Locke went on to observe,
it was this very tendency to cede great discretion to wise rulers
that gave rise to the saying, "That the reigns of good princes
have been always most dangerous to the liberties of their peo-
ple."106 For alas, good princes tend to be followed by those who
"manag[e] the government with different thoughts." When this
has happened, Locke acknowledged with characteristic under-
statement, it "often occasioned contest, and sometimes public
disorders, before the people could recover their original right
and get that to be declared not to be prerogative which truly
never was so.''10° Justice Frankfurter expressed the same
thought in his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case:
"The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It
does come, however slowly, from the generative force of un-
checked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most
disinterested assertion of authority. ' ' 08
The generation that gave us our Constitution was skeptical
of Locke's executive prerogative, because they saw in it a threat
to their liberties. The judicial prerogative deserves no better.
105. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 202.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 343 U.S. at 594 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
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